Files
paperspec/tools/oracle/crypto.py
T
alexmandClaude a09d158e16 feat: minted keys, VRF seeds, RFC 9162 proofs, history roots, tag URIs and a transparency log
Keys (spec/02 §2.4), the rule paperstack settled on:
- A work key is a Scholar-style citation key, a hyphen and the first four
  Crockford base32 characters of SHA-256("scienting-key/1:" + identity),
  where the identity is the first of doi, arxiv, isbn, pmid, pmcid and
  openalex in same_as, else the folded title, year and family name. A
  collision lengthens the later key by two characters; a key is minted
  once and never recomputed. A document key adds .si, .v<seq> or .<type>
  for versions other than the version of record.
- Every fixture key is now minted (hale2026harmonic-damb,
  okafor2025solvent-acth, writer2027fixed-ynr7.v3, tiny2026tiny-j4qm), so
  every node and record ID was re-minted and the docs rewritten to match.
  The validator checks the document key against the work key and version
  (doc.key.work) and the hash part against the identifier (doc.key.suffix).
  vectors/keys.jsonl pins the cases paperstack's tests pin.

Review:
- Spot-check seeds are ECVRF-EDWARDS25519-SHA512-TAI proofs (RFC 9381),
  implemented in tools/oracle/vrf.py in plain Python and reproduced
  against the RFC's Example 16; the sample ranks by the VRF output. The
  earlier Ed25519 seed could be ground by a dishonest checker.
- RFC 9162 inclusion and consistency proofs (crypto.inclusion_path,
  verify_inclusion, consistency_proof, verify_consistency) with
  scienting-proof/1, vectors/proofs.jsonl and two fixture records.
- document.json carries `history`, the root over the corrections, with
  the empty-tree hash for none (spec/11 §11.5, rule doc.history).
- A provisional transparency log (spec/23): log entries, signed-note
  checkpoints with key hashes as transparency logs share them, the rule
  that a logged revocation beats a self-asserted time, and vectors.
- Reserved signature schemes cose and ml-dsa-65 (spec/08 §8.4).

Identifiers and text:
- urn:scienting: becomes tag:scient.ing,2026: (RFC 4151), since the URN
  namespace was never registered.
- Unicode 16.0 is pinned for normalization and categories (spec/01 §1.4);
  the checker refuses another version.

Checking:
- check.py: keys, proofs, VRF and checkpoint vectors; the proof and
  checkpoint records; a check that every ID and hash the prose quotes
  exists in the fixtures or vectors; three more broken packages
  (history-wrong, key-suffix, key-work).
- stress.py: key, VRF, proof and checkpoint properties.
- Docs: a keys section in the concepts and FAQ, rationale entries for
  keys, VRF, proofs, tag URIs and the Unicode pin, a "Looking ahead"
  section, media-type registration and OCI distribution notes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 23:21:57 -04:00

218 lines
6.4 KiB
Python

"""Keyed hashing, key derivation, Merkle roots and Ed25519.
Non-normative; see spec/05-hashes.md and spec/08-fidelity.md.
HKDF and Ed25519 come from the `cryptography` package.
"""
import hashlib
from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey, Ed25519PublicKey
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from . import jcs
def hkdf(ikm, salt, info, length=32):
"""HKDF-SHA-256, RFC 5869."""
return HKDF(algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), length=length, salt=salt, info=info).derive(ikm)
def team_key(secret):
return hkdf(secret, b"scienting-team-key/1", b"scienting-hash/1")
def key_id(key):
return hashlib.sha256(b"scienting-key-id/1" + key).hexdigest()[:16]
def page_hash(page_fp_hex):
return hashlib.sha256(b"scienting-page-hash/1" + bytes.fromhex(page_fp_hex)).hexdigest()
def page_key(page_fps_hex, context):
ikm = b"".join(bytes.fromhex(h) for h in page_fps_hex)
return hkdf(ikm, b"scienting-page-key/1", context.encode("utf-8"))
# --- Merkle trees (RFC 6962 hashing) ------------------------------------------
def _leaf(data):
return hashlib.sha256(b"\x00" + data).digest()
def _node(left, right):
return hashlib.sha256(b"\x01" + left + right).digest()
def _mth(leaves):
n = len(leaves)
if n == 1:
return leaves[0]
k = 1
while k * 2 < n:
k *= 2
return _node(_mth(leaves[:k]), _mth(leaves[k:]))
def merkle_root(items):
"""Root over receipt items: each item is a list such as ["node", id, hash]."""
if not items:
raise ValueError("a Merkle root needs at least one item")
return _mth([_leaf(jcs.dumpb(list(it))) for it in items]).hex()
def receipt_items(receipt):
items = [["node", nid, h] for nid, h in receipt.get("nodes", [])]
items += [list(r) for r in receipt.get("records", [])]
return items
EMPTY_ROOT = hashlib.sha256(b"").hexdigest()
def history_root(items):
"""Root over an append-only history, with RFC 9162's hash of the empty list for no items."""
if not items:
return EMPTY_ROOT
return _mth([_leaf(jcs.dumpb(list(it))) for it in items]).hex()
def leaf_hash(item):
return _leaf(jcs.dumpb(list(item))).hex()
# --- RFC 9162 proofs (§2.1.3 and §2.1.4) ---------------------------------------
def _path(m, leaves):
"""PATH(m, D[n]): the inclusion path for the leaf at index m, as RFC 9162 §2.1.3.1 defines it."""
n = len(leaves)
if n == 1:
return []
k = 1
while k * 2 < n:
k *= 2
if m < k:
return _path(m, leaves[:k]) + [_mth(leaves[k:])]
return _path(m - k, leaves[k:]) + [_mth(leaves[:k])]
def inclusion_path(items, index):
"""The audit path of `items[index]` in the tree over `items`, as hex hashes, leaf-most first."""
if not 0 <= index < len(items):
raise ValueError("index outside the tree")
return [h.hex() for h in _path(index, [_leaf(jcs.dumpb(list(it))) for it in items])]
def verify_inclusion(root, leaf, index, size, path):
"""Whether `path` proves that the leaf hash `leaf` is item `index` of a tree of `size` with `root`
(RFC 9162 §2.1.3.2). Never raises."""
try:
if not 0 <= index < size:
return False
fn, sn = index, size - 1
r = bytes.fromhex(leaf)
for p in path:
p = bytes.fromhex(p)
if sn == 0:
return False
if fn & 1 or fn == sn:
r = _node(p, r)
while fn & 1 == 0 and fn != 0:
fn >>= 1
sn >>= 1
else:
r = _node(r, p)
fn >>= 1
sn >>= 1
return sn == 0 and r.hex() == root
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return False
def _subproof(m, leaves, b):
n = len(leaves)
if m == n:
return [] if b else [_mth(leaves)]
k = 1
while k * 2 < n:
k *= 2
if m <= k:
return _subproof(m, leaves[:k], b) + [_mth(leaves[k:])]
return _subproof(m - k, leaves[k:], False) + [_mth(leaves[:k])]
def consistency_proof(items, m):
"""PROOF(m, D[n]): what shows the tree over the first m items is a prefix of the tree over all n
(RFC 9162 §2.1.4.1), as hex hashes; empty when m is 0 or n."""
n = len(items)
if not 0 <= m <= n:
raise ValueError("m outside the tree")
if m == 0 or m == n:
return []
return [h.hex() for h in _subproof(m, [_leaf(jcs.dumpb(list(it))) for it in items], True)]
def verify_consistency(root_m, root_n, m, n, proof):
"""Whether `proof` shows the tree of size m with `root_m` is a prefix of the tree of size n with `root_n`
(RFC 9162 §2.1.4.2). Never raises."""
try:
if m == 0:
return not proof and root_m == EMPTY_ROOT
if m == n:
return not proof and root_m == root_n
if not 0 < m < n or not proof:
return False
proof = [bytes.fromhex(p) for p in proof]
fn, sn = m - 1, n - 1
while fn & 1:
fn >>= 1
sn >>= 1
if fn == 0:
fr = sr = bytes.fromhex(root_m)
else:
fr = sr = proof[0]
proof = proof[1:]
for c in proof:
if sn == 0:
return False
if fn & 1 or fn == sn:
fr = _node(c, fr)
sr = _node(c, sr)
while fn & 1 == 0 and fn != 0:
fn >>= 1
sn >>= 1
else:
sr = _node(sr, c)
fn >>= 1
sn >>= 1
return sn == 0 and fr.hex() == root_m and sr.hex() == root_n
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return False
# --- Ed25519 (RFC 8032) -------------------------------------------------------
def ed25519_public(secret):
"""The 32-byte public key of a 32-byte Ed25519 secret."""
return Ed25519PrivateKey.from_private_bytes(secret).public_key().public_bytes_raw()
def ed25519_sign(secret, msg):
return Ed25519PrivateKey.from_private_bytes(secret).sign(msg)
def ed25519_verify(public, msg, signature):
"""True when `signature` is a valid Ed25519 signature of `msg` under `public`; never raises."""
if len(public) != 32 or len(signature) != 64:
return False
try:
Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(public).verify(signature, msg)
except (InvalidSignature, ValueError):
return False
return True